In the absence of market frictions, the cost of carry model of stock index futures pricing predicts that returns on the underlying stock index and the associated stock index futures contract will be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Evidence suggests, however, that this prediction is violated with clear evidence that the stock index futures market leads the stock market. We argue that traditional tests, which assume that the underlying data generating process is constant, might be prone to overstate the lead-lag relationship. Using a new test for lead-lag relationships based on cross correlations and cross bicorrelations we find that, contrary to results from using the traditional methodology, periods where the futures market leads the cash market are few and far between and when any lead-lag relationship is detected, it does not last long. Overall, our results are consistent with the prediction of the standard cost of carry model and market efficiency.
Introduction
The lead-lag relationship between stock and stock index futures markets has been the subject of intense empirical investigation in recent years (see, for example, Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) , Herbst, McCormack and West (1987) , Stoll and Whaley (1990) , Chan (1992) and Tse (1995) ). In the absence of market frictions and transaction costs, the returns on a stock index and its corresponding underlying index futures contract will be perfectly positively contemporaneously correlated. In reality, however, a number of researchers have found significant evidence that there is cross autocorrelation between the returns on stock index futures and the returns on the underlying index, that is, there is a lead-lag relationship between these markets.
Whilst there seems to be a consensus on the finding that stock index futures markets lead underlying stock markets, there are problems with extant tests of lead-lag relationships and as such, these findings may be overstated. First, traditional tests of lead-lag relationships are typically carried out in the spirit of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) linear causality tests. The problem here is that any potential nonlinearities in the data are ignored. That financial time series exhibit nonlinear behaviour is well documented in the literature (see, for example, Brooks (1996 ), or Hsieh (1991 ) and failure to account for this could lead to biased results. In addition to the statistical evidence regarding the presence of nonlinearities, there are sound economic reasons why nonlinearities may be present in the pricing relationship between stock and stock index futures markets. Specifically, in the absence of transaction costs arbitrage between stock and stock index futures markets is based on deviations of the futures price from its fair value as given by the spot price adjusted for the cost of carrying the underlying portfolio to maturity of the futures contract. In the presence of transaction costs, however, there are bounds on such deviations within which arbitrage will not be triggered. Therefore, there will be thresholds within which the relative difference between the futures and spot price can fluctuate without triggering arbitrage. The result of this is nonlinearity in the relationship between stock and stock index futures markets and this nonlinearity may spill over into the lead-lag relationship between the markets. 1 Second, the models used to investigate lead-lag relationships typically impose the often inappropriate restriction that the parameters of such models are stable over quite long periods. The potential problem here is that changes in the nature of the lead-lag relationship over shorter periods may not be captured by these models. Alternatively, it may be the case that the lead-lag relationship is particularly strong over a short period such that the leadlag relationship appears to be present over the whole sample when in actual fact it is not.
In this paper, we propose an alternative method for testing lead-lag relationships between stock and stock index futures markets based on Hinich (1996) . The tests that we utilise are similar in spirit to the Granger-Sims causality tests used in the extant literature but have the advantage that both linear 3 and nonlinear causality can be examined in a coherent testing environment without imposing strong restrictions on the stability of the relationship. To anticipate the findings in the paper, the results from using this alternative methodology show that the lead-lag relationship is much less pronounced than that suggested by the more traditional Granger-Sims causality tests, suggesting that the traditional testing framework has a tendency to overstate the strength of the lead-lag relationship.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews the existing literature on lead-lag relationships. In order to facilitate comparison, section three implements tests of the leadlag relationship using the traditionally employed methodology whilst section four discusses and implements the alternative testing methodology. Sections five and six presents the results of applying the alternative methodology and offers some concluding remarks respectively.
Literature Review
If stock and stock index futures markets are functioning efficiently, then in the absence of market frictions, returns in the two markets will be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Tests of the proposition that there is no lead-lag relationship then essentially become causality tests with the model typically used being based on Sims (1972) (see, for example, Stoll and Whaley (1990) , Chan (1992) and Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) ). The model is of the form In contrast to this prediction many studies, often using intra-daily data, find significant lead-lag relationships between stock and stock index futures markets (see, amongst others, Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) , Kipnis and Tsang, (1983) , Stoll and Whaley (1990) , Chan (1992) and Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwarz (1994) ). Attempts to rationalise such a relationship typically appeal to differences in market microstructure and other frictions that can disrupt the cost of carry relationship. Grossman and Miller (1988) , for example, argue that lower transaction costs and greater liquidity in the futures market provides more immediacy to traders and hence traders will transact in the futures market first with the result that the futures market will lead the spot market.
In an analysis of the lead-lag relation between the DAX Index and DAX Index Futures contract in Germany, Grünbichler, Longstaff and Schwarz (1994) focus on the role of different trading systems
(screen versus floor trading) in explaining the lead-lag relationship and document evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the price discovery process is accelerated through screen trading in the futures market which implies that the futures will lead the spot. Stoll and Whaley (1990) , on the other hand, consider the impact that nontrading and bid-ask effects may have on the lead-lag relationship 2 and find that even after adjustments for nontrading and bid-ask effects is made, the lead-lag relationship between the S&P 500 Index and Index Futures market persists. At first blush, the implication of these findings is that the lead-lag relationship is robust to any effect that might be termed institutional frictions such as stale prices in an index have and it is more an economic feature that needs to be explained. We shall argue in the following sections that there is another explanation for the apparent robustness of the lead-lag relationship, specifically that the reason why lead-lag relationships seem so pronounced is that the methodology used has a tendency to overstate the strength of the relationship.
Results From Using The Traditional Testing Methodology
In this section we investigate the lead-lag relationship between the FTSE 100 Index and Index
Futures contract for the UK and between the S&P 500 Index and Index Futures contract for the US.
Most tests of the lead-lag relationship make use of intra-daily data on stock index and stock index futures returns. One of the problems associated with tests of lead-lag relationships based on intradaily data is the possible effect nonsynchronous trading can have on the results. Indeed, the evidence suggests that it can have a substantive impact on observed return behaviour (see Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Miller, Muthuswamy and Whaley (1994) (3) when (3) is estimated using rolling least squares show that there is substantial instability in the coefficient estimate and therefore the lead-lag relationship may actually be overstated if we force the data for the entire sample to be generated by the same model. We evaluate this proposition more fully in the next section.
An Alternative Testing Methodology
The results in the previous section clearly demonstrate that there is substantial instability in the leadlag relationship which needs to be accounted for. Such a method that allows for this instability while at the same time allowing for the testing of a nonlinear lead-lag relationships is proposed in Hinich (1996) . Assume that we have two stationary 
allows analysis of relatively short-term behaviour of the market which would be unobservable in an analysis of longer periods or time. This also removes the inappropriate restriction enforced in many papers that the model parameters and therefore the data generating process remains constant throughout the entire sample period. Thus although the sample covers both the pre-and post-1987 stock market crash, the "windowing" approach used here implies that atypical patterns during this period can be observed, but will not affect the result overall. A window is defined as "significant" if either the H xy , H xxy or H yyx statistics are significant at the 1% level. A strict criterion is used so that only the most extreme results trigger a rejection of independence. The results for H xxy and H yyx statistics are calculated using the standardised residuals from a VAR(2,2) fit to the returns, which is sufficient to remove any linear (cross)dependence in the series.
Results of the Alternative Testing Methodology
The cross-correlation test gives no significant windows for the US, and only one significant window for the UK. This single significant window from a total of 56 corresponds to the period 12 March 1992 -4 May 1992 where the H xy test statistic is highly significant with a p-value of 0.0048. Some statistics associated with this window are given in Table II (Kawaller et al., 1993; Albert et al., 1993) . In the context of the analysis used here, it is straightforward to evaluate this proposition. This is achieved by calculating the correlation between the test statistics (H xy , H xxy or H yyx ) and the variances of the individual series for each window, which is used as a measure of the volatility of the series. Since contemporaneous correlations have been removed from the test statistics, if the proposition is correct (that is the markets are more closely bound together during periods of high market volatility), one would expect a large and negative correlation between the test statistics and the variances of the two individual series. Table   IV shows that for the UK, this is indeed the case. The correlations between the xy statistics and the variances are smaller than -0.5, indicating strongly that, when the volatilities are high, the values of the test statistics will be lower, and thus that the individual markets show less evidence of feedback relationships and are therefore bound more closely together. We can test this formally using the Fisher test for significance of the correlations. The test statistic is given by
where r is the sample correlation and n is the sample size (in this case, the number of windows). z is distributed approximately normally under the null hypothesis. The Fisher statistic shows that for the UK, the negative relationship between the cross-correlation test statistic and the variance of the series is indeed statistically significant. The correlation of the third order statistics with the variances are also fairly strong and negative for the UK (at around -0.2), although not as strong as for the linear cross-correlations, and not statistically significant. The picture for the US is very different: the correlations between the test statistics and the variances of the individual series are always positive but never significant. The important policy implication of this finding is that UK governments need not worry about the effects of large variations in futures (or spot market) prices upon the overall stability of the financial system. However, no such reassurance applies to the US.
The differences in the number of significant cross-bicorrelation windows for the US and the UK data might be attributable to either differing market microstructures, or in government policies and different macroeconomic conditions that existed in the two countries over the sample period. In the US, the primary function of market makers is to reduce volatility, while in the UK, it is to ensure that there is sufficient liquidity in the market to generate immediacy for agents who wish to buy or sell. Moreover, in the US, market makers can request that trading be temporarily suspended during times of exceptional market turbulence; market makers in the UK have no such protection. These differences in microstructure are picked up by the nonlinear rather than the linear causality tests since this is a nonlinear, volatility-related, issue. 15
Conclusions
This paper has employed a new technique for examining the extent of cross-correlations and crossbicorrelations between stock index and stock index futures contracts. The results show that these markets do not exhibit much evidence of second or third order cross-correlations, apparently consistent with efficient market theory. Given that the data examined is, however, of daily frequency, then the mere existence of a higher proportion of significant windows than one would expect if the data were drawn from two independent white noise processes is nonetheless a surprising result. Moreover, these results cannot satisfactorily be explained with reference to the microstructure arguments of Stoll and Whaley (1990) , since nonsynchronous trading and other such anomalies should not be present in daily data. It is also of interest to note the differing results of applying the same methodology to the UK and US markets. These results have implications for the degree of integration of the two markets, an issue which has been of great concern to market practitioners and politicians, as well as academics, following the publication of the report by the Brady Commission (1988) . Under most market conditions, we find that the stock and stock index futures markets are operating very closely together, with price movements for both occurring on the same day and in the same direction, leading to cross-correlations and cross-bicorrelations that are not significantly different from zero.
Finally, it is also useful to observe that there is more nonlinear cross-causality than linear crosscausality between the S&P 500 spot and futures markets, so it appears that, at least at daily frequency, a linear model of the VAR type would generally be insufficient to characterise the dynamics of the relation between the series, in agreement with the conclusions of Dwyer et al. (1996) who undertake a very high-frequency analysis of the S&P 500 markets. Our results are also consistent with Kawaller et al. (1987) , who find that the contemporaneous correlations typically "swamp all lag impacts in both directions" (p1329), implying that any observed lead / lag relationships are unlikely to yield significant profits if employed in an active trading strategy. Unlike Kleidon and Whaley (1992) however, we find that this integration did not break down in the UK market during October 1987, although in fact there was some evidence of a breakdown during the middle of 1992. The latter may be attributable to the effects of the ERM debacle and the ensuing interest rate uncertainty which will more directly influence the relationship between stock index and stock index futures prices than a stock market crash which should affect both markets in a similar fashion. Yadav, Pope and Paudyal (1994) and Dwyer, Locke and Yu (1996) for evidence relating to the US and Brooks and Garrett (1996) for evidence relating to the UK. 2 The importance of this is that if factors such as nontrading are present then they may induce a spurious lead-lag relationship because in the case of nontrading the index will contain stale prices and thus the futures will appear to lead the spot for no other reason than the effect of stale prices on the index. Note also that technically, we can distinguish between nontrading and nonsynchronous trading. Nonsynchronous trading is the situation where securities trade at least once every time interval but not necessarily at the end of the interval, whereas nontrading is the situation where securities do not trade for several time intervals. However, since the effect of both of these is to induce autocorrelation in stock returns, we will use the two interchangeably here.
3 If all of the stocks within the portfolio have the same probability of nontrading then the coefficient on lagged observed returns in the AR(1) model provides an estimate of that nontrading probability. 4 Notice that the summations in (4) and (5) exclude contemporaneous terms. This is to avoid rejection of the null hypothesis of independence because of the strong contemporaneous correlations that we would expect to exist between spot and futures returns. 5 The results are not, however, sensitive to fairly large changes in this parameter.
